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TREATIES IN A CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY*
Louis Henkin**
During these years of the Bicentennial of the Constitution, recur-
rent constitutional controversy has caused many to wonder whether
the Framers' dispositions for the governance of our foreign affairs
were worthy of celebration. Some have been moved to ask whether, as
regards foreign affairs at least, the Constitution was adequate for our
third century.
Much recent controversy, and much academic debate, has in-
volved "War Powers" and other powers of Congress and of the Presi-
dent that may fall within a constitutional "twilight zone," where their
respective authority is uncertain or their powers may be concurrent.'
In these pages I lay those issues aside2 and revisit the treaty power,
recently a focus of controversy arising out of major arms control
agreements with the Soviet Union. I inquire whether the provisions
governing treaties, ordained in 1789 for an "aristocratic republic,"'3
are appropriate to the constitutional democracy we have become.
The constitutional issues of treaty-making are different from those
of the twilight zone. The twilight zone is the field of tension between
Congress as legislature and the President as executive and as Com-
mander in Chief, issues in treaty-making are between the President
and one chamber of Congress, the Senate, with the Senate here acting
in an executive capacity and exercising jointly with the President a
function which the Framers assumed to be an executive function.
4
* This essay is an adaptation of one of the Cooley Lectures delivered at the University of
Michigan Law School, Nov. 14-16, 1988, on the theme "Constitutionalism, Democracy and
Foreign Affairs," due to be published by Columbia University Press in 1990. I am pleased to
dedicate this essay to the memory of Professor William Bishop. Professor Bishop made
important contributions to our understanding of the Treaty Power in the U.S. constitutional
system, notably during the campaign to defeat Senator Bricker's 1950-55 efforts to have the
Constitution amended so as to emasculate the Treaty Power.
** University Professor Emeritus and Special Service Professor of Law, Columbia Univer-
sity School of Law.
1. The "twilight zone" is Justice Jackson's characterization in his famous concurring opinion
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952).
2. The tensions in the twilight zone and the relevance of political ideology to their resolution
were the subject of the first Cooley Lecture, noted above. See also Henkin, Foreign Affairs and
the Constitution, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 284 (1987-88).
3. See infra pages 410, 422.
4. In the division implied in "separation of powers," the Europeans saw treaty making as
Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy
The twilight zone is an arena of competition for unexpressed, uncer-
tain constitutional authority; the issues of treaty-making provide prin-
cipally a study of friction in the exercise of an explicit constitutional
mandate to share power. But the two sets of issues, sharing a common
history, reflect the same political transformations: as regards treaty-
making - as for the twilight zone - history has reshaped what the
Framers probably intended. Here, too, there is some unhappiness
with the original dispositions and some pressure for reallocating them.
Here too, I will suggest, principles of constitutionalism and democracy
are relevant, both to the issues that have arisen under the existing con-
stitutional mandate and to recurrent proposals for change.
I address principally relations between "the Treaty-Makers," the
President and Senate, under article II, section 2, where constitutional
controversy has recurrently - and again recently - swirled. I con-
sider also, briefly, the relevance of constitutionalism and democracy to
our jurisprudence on treaties under the Supremacy Clause.5
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES ABOUT THE TREATY POWER
Constitutional controversies under the Treaty Power erupted early
in our history, and during 200 years the infinite variety of interna-
tional relations and of constitutional politics have continued to gener-
ate issues. Some of the controversies reflect differences as to the
meaning or implications of the constitutional text; some reflect dissat-
isfaction with what the text has come to mean, or with how it has
worked.
It is unnecessary to revisit the storms generated by the Jay Treaty
of 1796, or even the Treaty of Versailles, now 70 years ago. We find
uncertainties and controversies in our daily papers. In 1988, the Sen-
ate denied President Reagan's power to interpret the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty other than as the Senate had interpreted it
when the Senate consented to making that treaty. Later the Senate in
effect declared its constitutional views on that issue as a condition of
its consent to the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty. A few
years ago the Senate challenged President Carter's authority to termi-
nate the Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan) without
the consent of of Congress or at least of the Senate. Members of Con-
part of the executive power. In the Constitution, too, the power to make treaties is in Article II,
which is devoted to the executive power.
5. Treaties appear in the Constitution in article II, section 2, the power to make treaties, and
in Article VI, declaring treaties to be law of the land and supreme to state law. See infra page
424. Article I, section 10, provides that no State (of the United States) shall enter into any treaty.
Article III provides that the judicial power of the United States shall extend also to cases arising
under United States treaties.
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gress went to court in an attempt to enjoin carrying out the Panama
Canal Treaty, claiming that it was beyond the powers of the President
and Senate under the Constitution.
6
Other issues are older, but recur, and might yet trouble us again in
the next century.7 Above all, repeatedly during 200 years, Senate and
President have exchanged recriminations, the Senate accusing the
President of frustrating the Senate's constitutional role, the President
charging the Senate with abusing that role and embarrassing the
United States in its relations with other countries. Again and again,
during 200 years, Senators have challenged the President's authority
to conclude international agreements as executive agreements without
Senate consent.8 Every year during 200 years members of the House
of Representatives have expressed resentment at their exclusion from
treaty-making, and there have been innumerable proposals for amend-
ing the Constitution to undo that "error" of the Framers.
As for many other constitutional issues in foreign affairs, the
courts have provided few answers. As a result, issues remain un-
resolved, constitutional processes suffer, Senate and President resort to
political weapons, and constitutional relations in the United States as
well as foreign relations with other governments are roiled.
For present purposes, I ask: What does the constitutional text
mean and how was it intended to work? Has history reinterpreted text
or otherwise resolved issues? How has the process projected by the
Framers worked, and has it worked well enough? Do constitutional
theory and democratic ideology offer guidelines, or commend - or
command - constitutional change, whether by formal constitutional
amendment or by reinterpretation?
TEXT AND FRAMERS' INTENT
The constitutional provision conferring power to make treaties is
brief:
[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators pres-
ent concur .... 9
6. Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978); see
also infra note 39.
7. One controversy, I hope, will not be resurrected: the campaign led by Senator Bricker to
have the Constitution amended so as - they thought - to limit sharply the uses of the treaty
power, and make it impossible for the United States to adhere to international human rights
covenants.
8. Senator Robert Dole went to court to try to prevent President Carter from returning the
crown of St. Stephen to Hungary without a treaty approved by the Senate. See Dole v. Carter,
569 F.2d 1109 (10th Cir. 1977).
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
[Vol. 10:406
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The text seems simple and clear, but even clear constitutional text is
not wholly clear. Notably, we have "advice and consent," a historic
phrase that has entered our daily language; but what is "advice," when
and by whom is it to be given, and must it be heeded? Consent has
proved clear enough, but not crystal clear: may consent be conditional,
and what kinds of conditions may the Senate impose? And what is a
treaty? May the President make other agreements without Senate
consent?
As elsewhere in constitutional discussions of foreign affairs, here,
too, we hear little of "original intent." But surely "original intent" has
its claims, and there is some evidence as to what the Framers intended.
The treaty clause is an original and unique arrangement, a compro-
mise determined by the Framers. Here the Framers turned their backs
on Locke and Montesquieu, on British and European practice. Euro-
pean practice and "separation" theory saw treaty-making as an execu-
tive power, but, perhaps with George III on their minds, the Framers
were not disposed to entrust the new executive office they were creat-
ing with that much independent power by leaving treaty-making to the
President.
We now think of the treaty power as the President's, subject to
Senate consent, but that may not have been what the Framers in-
tended. In large measure, at Philadelphia the treaty power developed
separately, independently of the delegates' general conception of the
new Presidency-to-be.10 For their treaty power, the Framers began
with the Articles of Confederation, under which Congress - the Con-
tinental Congress, which had executive as well as legislative power -
made treaties. But under the Articles, Congress needed the consent of
nine states in order to make a treaty. At Philadelphia, even after it
was clear that there would be an Executive, the Framers seemed dis-
posed to leave treaty-making to Congress, or rather to one chamber of
the new Congress, the Senate. Then, perhaps recalling the difficulties
of negotiation and diplomacy by Congress under the Articles, the
Framers thought to give some role in the process to the new Execu-
tive, and to provide for treaty-making by the Senate with the Execu-
tive as its agent for negotiation. As it emerged, we know, the treaty
power is listed under Article II, which begins: "The Executive power
shall be vested in a President," and the power "to make treaties" is
given to the President subject to Senate advice and consent. But it is
not obvious that in the end the Framers had decided to establish a
process significantly different from what they had contemplated ear-
10. See Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and Abrogation of
Treaties, 55 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1979); THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (J. Jay).
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lier, i.e., treaty-making by the Senate with the President as the Senate's
agent, or perhaps as a joint responsibility, with the task of negotiation
left to the President alone.'I In any event, what the Framers intended,
it appears, is Presidential negotiation, upon advice of the Senate before
negotiation, with continuing Senate advice during the process of nego-
tiation, and, in the end, the President making the treaty to which the
Senate had consented.
Note: the Framers did not provide for "advice and consent" by
Congress, but by the Senate alone. The Senate would not be acting as
part of the legislature but in a special, executive capacity. For this role
the Framers selected the body that was to be the smaller, less represen-
tative, less accountable, chamber of Congress. And, it appears, the
Framers selected the Senate for this special treaty-making role, be-
cause it was to have those undemocratic characteristics. The Senate
was also to be the special representative and guardian of state inter-
ests. Consent of two-thirds of the Senate, I note, was probably seen as
not too different in effect from the consent of nine States required
under the Articles.
EXPERIENCE UNDER THE TREATY POWER
History reshaped the treaty power as it reshaped other powers allo-
cated to Congress and the President in foreign affairs. Change in the
treaty process came early, and continued, due to larger changes that
had not been - and could not have been - anticipated. There was
change in the character of the Presidency, and change in the character
of the Senate. Political parties emerged, with their consequences for
relations between Executive and Senate. The United States grew, and
so did its place in a changing world system. The character of United
States foreign affairs changed. The role of treaties in international re-
lations and in the foreign relations of the United States changed.
The Framers had probably intended that the President and a small
Senate would deliberate together, prior to and during negotiations,
leading to treaties acceptable to both. The intended "advice" function
atrophied, and died early; in fact, advice before and during treaty ne-
gotiations hardly took off. President Washington came to the Senate
with a treaty already negotiated, wanting consent, not advice; the Sen-
ate offered him advice and Washington swore never to go there
again. 12
11. See supra sources cited at note 10.
12. This story is widely told; see, e.g., E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS
1787-1957, at 209-10 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
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If the President had sought advice along the way, presumably
there would have been an agreed U.S. position early, subject to modifi-
cation during negotiation with the foreign country. Then Senate con-
sent would ordinarily come easily. With the demise of advice prior to
and during negotiation, the Senate considered the treaty for the first
time after it was negotiated, and Senate advice appeared at the time of,
and as a condition of, consent. 13 The Senate used the consent require-
ment to "advise" the President as to the kind of treaty the Senate
wanted and the kind of changes that would make the President's
treaty acceptable. Often the Senate cluttered the treaty with reserva-
tions, amendments, understandings, and other conditions. Many trea-
ties required renegotiation.
The result was a sharp bifurcation of the treaty process between
the Presidential stage and the Senate stage, which frustrated Presi-
dents, annoyed foreign governments, and troubled United States for-
eign relations. The Senate sometimes rejected a treaty that had been
carefully and painstakingly negotiated, to the embarrassment of the
President and the dismay of the other government. Early in the nine-
teenth century foreign governments decried the U.S. treaty process as
making it impossible to do diplomatic business with the United States.
Early in our century a Secretary of State expressed doubt that an im-
portant treaty would ever again receive Senate consent. The Senate
was described as the "graveyard of treaties." In time, the Senate be-
came more "sophisticated": instead of rejecting a treaty, it simply
shelved it (becoming not a graveyard but a place for cold storage).
For a notorious contemporary example, the Genocide Convention was
on the Senate shelf for 37 years. The United States finally ratified the
Genocide Convention in 1988, although the United States had been a
leading exponent of the treaty 40 years earlier.
The world has grown accustomed to - but not much happier with
- our treaty process. Its inefficiency has been alleviated somewhat by
some revival of the advice function. The Executive now anticipates
and seeks to determine the terms to which the Senate will consent.
The Executive Branch will now consult with (i.e., seek "advice" of)
Senators and Senate staff, though not formally with the whole Senate.
Sometimes the President appoints a member of the Senate to the dele-
gation negotiating an important treaty, thus providing some "advice"
as to what some Senators think and what the Senate is likely to do.
But - contrary to the original intent - treaty making remains essen-
tially a Presidential power subject to Senate modification or veto. The
13. See infra page 415.
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treaty-making process continues to leave all concerned - the Presi-
dent, the Senate, foreign governments, as well as the House of Repre-
sentatives, which remains excluded from the process, and many aware
citizens - less than content.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES UNDER THE TREATY POWER
The relationship between the President and Senate in treaty mak-
ing became, and generally remains, adversary instead of collaborative.
At best, it is often an "arms-length" relationship; sometimes it is exac-
erbated by antagonism and distrust. That is the notorious history of
President Wilson's experience with the Versailles Treaty. In our day,
SALT I and SALT II, the ABM and INF treaties, the Panama Canal
Treaty and others have not escaped friction between President and
Senate.
Over 200 years, there has been much tension between the President
and Senate over treaties, but there have been few constitutional, juris-
prudential issues at the heart of these tensions; rather, we have had the
friction that is perhaps inevitable in the exercise of shared power by
two proud, independent, separated constitutional bodies.14 Sometimes
these tensions have been aggravated by partisan, ideological, and insti-
tutional differences. Presidents have charged the Senate with abusing
its constitutional role, by delaying consent, by forcing renegotiation,
by imposing improper conditions on its consent. The Senate has
charged the Executive with abuse of process by excluding the Senate
from early planning and negotiation ("advice"), with lack of candor,
concealment, even deception. Not infrequently, Senators have de-
clared that the President denied them access to the negotiating data
and have suspected uncommunicated discussions or even secret under-
standings with the foreign state.
These recriminations are perhaps inevitable, systemic, built into
Article II as it has developed. They may not be readily curable or
easily palliated. At bottom, I stress, they are not issues of constitu-
tional law, and do not turn on constitutional construction. But in the
context of a relationship susceptible to such friction, when a small
constitutional issue occasionally arises it may blow up into a small
crisis, as in 1987-88 in regard to the ABM and INF treaties. In that
instance, the Executive and the Senate differed sharply over minor
constitutional implications of the treaty-making power.
14. See the famous statement by Justice Brandeis, infra page 427.
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Implications of the Consent Requirement
Some implications of the procedure prescribed by the Constitution
are not disputed. The President can negotiate or not, can heed or dis-
regard Senate advice if, whenever, and however given. The Senate can
offer any advice, and can refuse consent for any reason or no reason; it
can consent on conditions. 15 The President can make (bind the United
States to) the treaty if the Senate has consented to it; he cannot make
the treaty without Senate consent.
One implication of the constitutional requirement of Senate con-
sent seems obvious but it surfaced - and was confirmed - only re-
cently in the tempest surrounding the ABM treaty. At stake was a
politically important difference between a "narrow" and a "broad" in-
terpretation of that treaty, between a construction that would permit
and one that would forbid steps towards a Strategic Defense Initiative
("Star Wars") program. But the underlying constitutional issue,
though novel, was small, and the area of disagreement, though gener-
ating much heat, was comparatively narrow.
All were agreed that the President can make a treaty only if the
Senate has consented to it. Therefore, the President can make only the
treaty to which the Senate consents. Generally, the Senate consents to
what the text of the treaty provides, as reasonably interpreted. But if
there is any ambiguity, the treaty to which the Senate consents is, inev-
itably, the treaty as the Senate understands it. However, all were not
agreed upon what would constitute binding evidence of the Senate's
understanding.
The Senate has often explicitly declared its understanding of the
meaning of a possibly-ambiguous treaty provision by an express "un-
derstanding" in its resolution of consent. If the Senate declares its
understanding, the President must honor it: the treaty as so under-
stood is the treaty to which the Senate consents. The President com-
municates to the other party (or parties) the Senate's understanding of
the treaty as constituting the United States' understanding of it, and,
unless the other parties reject it, that becomes the meaning of the
treaty.
In the case of the ABM Treaty, the Senate's understanding of the
provision later in issue was not formally declared. But it was in fact
clear (and I think not seriously disputed) that the Senate had under-
15. Contrary to common parlance, the Senate cannot enter reservations to or amend a treaty;
in effect, it refuses consent to the text as it is, while declaring that it will consent if the text is
changed as indicated. This may be done ordinarily by amendment by the parties (in the case of a
bilateral treaty) or by reservation by the United States (in adhering to a multilateral treaty). See
infra page 415.
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stood the treaty to be more rather than less restrictive, less rather than
more permissive. For a time, the Executive Branch appeared to take
the position that if the Senate's understanding of a treaty was not for-
mally declared it was of no effect and need not govern the meaning of
the treaty for the United States later.16 That view, I think, is mis-
taken: whether or not the Senate expressed an understanding, what the
Senate in fact thought the treaty meant is the treaty to which the Sen-
ate consented. 17 The Executive Branch challenge to that view was un-
tenable, and the Executive may itself have abandoned it, but not
without leaving severe political bruises.
The ABM confrontation was unprecedented, but perhaps an inevi-
table consequence of our unique, complex treaty process involving in-
dependent, powerful, constitutionally-based institutions. The
controversy involved a major security treaty, concluded after long ne-
gotiations that were heavily shrouded; the subject of the treaty -
arms control generally, and the particular treaty under negotiation -
was esoteric and one as to which the Executive and the Senate were
both ambivalent, and both internally divided. Both President and Sen-
ate had been uneasy over making a commitment; both were distrustful
of the USSR; and the Senate and the Executive did not trust each
other fully. As to the particular treaty, a later President, less-than-
wholly sympathetic to the treaty and eager to relax its restraints, was
tempted to revise an earlier President's undertakings to which the Sen-
ate had consented. But the present majority of the Senate continued
to favor the treaty and resisted a new interpretation which it disfa-
vored. Above all, the Senate was determined to vindicate its earlier
consent and to preserve the integrity of its consent power.' 8
16. There appears to have been also an issue as to the Senate's reliance on informal Executive
communications. The Executive Branch insisted, in effect, that the Senate must accept what the
President formally communicates and not form any understandings on the basis of informal
communications from individuals in the Executive Branch. There is something to be said for the
view that ordinarily the Senate should not rely on views or communications of individual offi-
cials. But the Senate gave its consent to the treaty as it understood it, no matter how or from
whom it obtained that understanding.
17. See United States v. Stuart, 109 S. Ct. 1183, 1192 n.7 (1989), in which the Supreme Court
invoked the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 314,
comment d & § 325, reporters' note 5 (1987), and looked to the record of Senate preratification
materials as a guide to interpreting the treaty in question.
18. The President does not have to make a treaty even after the Senate gives its consent and
the President can terminate a treaty that has been made. See infra note 39. But if a treaty has
been made and has not been terminated, the Senate is entitled to resist a Presidential interpreta-
tion of a treaty that renders it effectively a treaty other than the one to which the Senate had
consented.
The Senate was not asserting a power to interpret a treaty at a later time. Once a treaty is
made, the Senate has no special authority in relation to it. The President later interprets the
treaty for purposes of executing it. Congress - both Houses - interpret the treaty for legisla-
tive purposes. Courts may interpret it for their purposes. The Supreme Court's interpretation of
[Vol. 10:406
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The controversy surrounding the interpretation of the ABM
Treaty highlights larger consequences of our treaty process and of the
separation of powers. In the United States, all branches of the govern-
ment are bound by the text of a treaty made by the United States as
the Senate understood it. Presumably, the United States must pursue
that interpretation also for international purposes. But the interna-
tional system - including international courts and arbitral tribunals
- is not bound by the subtleties of United States treaty procedure,
and by internal interpretations that are not expressed, adopted, and
communicated to the other parties to the treaty. The international
system, then, may come to an interpretation of a treaty different from
the one the Senate tacitly assumed. If that happens and is established,
the international interpretation of the treaty may later become the
meaning within the United States as well, a consequence of the "slip-
page" between internal and international law in our modified dualist
system. 19
Senate Conditions
As a consequence of the ABM controversy, there was constitu-
tional confrontation in 1988 between President and Senate in the case
of the INF treaty, brought on by the Senate's power to impose condi-
tions on its consent to a treaty. The Constitution says nothing about
Senate conditions to its consent, but the development of the Senate's
practice of giving consent on condition was the perhaps inevitable con-
sequence of the demise of the Senate's advice function and the bifurca-
tion of the treaty process between the Presidential stage and the Senate
stage.
Senate consent on condition developed early. Usually, the Senate
has consented on condition of a change in the treaty or, in the case of a
multilateral treaty, on condition that the United States adhere to the
treaty subject to one or more reservations. But the Senate has learned
to add other kinds of conditions which are not modifications of any
international obligation under the treaty and are therefore not of im-
portance to the other state (or states) party to the treaty. These condi-
a treaty made in deciding a case or controversy is authoritative for purposes of U.S. law and is
binding on all courts as well as on the political branches.
19. Monists see national and international law as parts of a common legal system, with inter-
national law supreme. Dualists see national and international law as discrete legal systems, and
national law determines whether to incorporate international law into national law in some ways
and the place of international law in the hierarchy of the national legal system. On monist and
dualist approaches to the relation of international law to national law, see, e.g., L. HENKIN, R.
PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 140-62 (2d
ed. 1987).
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tions, too, are usually treaty-related, usually benign, and usually not
unduly troublesome. For example, as a condition of its consent the
Senate may insist that the treaty shall not be self-executing but shall
require implementing legislation, sometimes even that the United
States shall not ratify the treaty until implementing legislation is
adopted.
20
Important, controversial treaties in particular - in our time, nota-
bly, arms control treaties - have often evoked other "non-amending"
kinds of conditions. In SALT II, for example, three kinds of "condi-
tions" were declared, some addressed to the President, some to the
U.S.S.R. (the other party to the treaty), some to the world. Various
conditions were imposed by the Senate in its consent to the controver-
sial Panama Canal Treaty.
2
Some Senate conditions are designed to enhance the power of the
Senate, or to constrain Presidential power. For example, the Senate
might decide to reserve a voice in the termination of the particular
treaty, to preclude Presidential termination of the treaty on his own
authority as the President did in the case of the Taiwan Defense
Treaty. 22 Sometimes the Senate uses conditions to score in battles
with the President. In consenting to the INF Treaty - following the
ABM controversy - the Senate declared a principle of treaty interpre-
tation as a constitutional principle, in the guise of a condition. The
Senate resolution provides:
That the Senate advise and consent to ratification of the Treaty...
subject to the following:
Condition:
20. See, e.g., the Senate conditions in two well-known instances, the 1950 Niagara Power
Treaty with Canada, and the Genocide Convention to which the Senate consented in 1986. On
the former, see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 134-35 (1972).
21. In addition to interpretive understandings discussed above, and conditions to consent,
the Senate has taken to attaching various "declarations" to its resolutions of consent. The Senate
does not intend such declarations to condition its consent but that seems to free the Senate to be
promiscuous with its declarations and some of them are of dubious "propriety." For example, in
consenting to the INF treaty the Senate resolution appended an array of declarations of varying
character. The Senate declared that because the incentive for Soviet non-compliance and the
difficulties of monitoring will be great, the United States should rely primarily on its own techni-
cal means of verification. The Senate took the occasion to advise the President as to the kinds of
further agreements he should negotiate. It declared its strong belief that respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms is essential to the develpment of friendly relations, and called
upon the U.S.S.R to live up to its international human rights agreements (some of which the
United States itself had not ratified). For the full text of the Senate resolution, see 82 AM. J.
INT'L L. 10-15 (1988).
Hypothetically, the Senate might impose conditions unrelated to the treaty; e.g., that the
President fire his Secretary of State or that he move the United States embassy in a certain
country to a different location. Such conditions are rare and probably "improper." But could
the President disregard them if the Senate declares that they are conditions on its consent to the
treaty? Can the President treat the condition as null, and the consent as unconditional?
22. See infra note 39.
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(1) Provided, that the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of
the INF Treaty is subject to the condition, based on the treaty Clauses of
the Constitution, that-
(A) the United States shall interpret the Treaty in accordance with
the common understanding of the Treaty shared by the President and
the Senate at the time the Senate gave its advice and consent to
ratification .... 23
In my view the constitutional principle declared by the Senate is
sound and its implications for treaty interpretation unexceptionable.
But its title as a condition is dubious. The President, eager to make
the treaty, accepted the Senate's consent subject to the Senate's "con-
dition," but issued a statement declaring the condition to be "im-
proper." Proper or not, such conditions are not very significant except
as a salvo in President-Senate warfare in the conduct of their shared
treaty power. Attaching a constitutional principle as a "condition" of
consent to a treaty does not bind future Presidents to that principle. A
future President might not agree that there is such a constitutional
principle. The principle may not bind even the President who ratified
that particular treaty. The principle is not really a condition of consent
but only an expression of the Senate's view of the Constitution. The
Senate's view may be disputed by the President and must stand or fall
on its merits.
Non-amending conditions sometimes reflect distrust between the
United States and the other party to the treaty, or Senate mistrust of
the Executive (or of later Executives). Sometimes such conditions are
blows in larger battles with the President. They reflect and inevitably
aggravate friction in the treaty process and beyond, another conse-
quence of our bifurcated treaty procedure.
CIRCUMVENTING THE TREATY POWER: EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
A recurrent issue between President and Senate arises from the
President's assertion of constitutional power to make some interna-
tional agreements on his own authority, without consent of the Senate.
The Senate sees such agreements - sole executive agreements - as,
in principle, unconstitutional attempts to circumvent the Treaty
Power by excluding Senate "advice" and avoiding Senate consent,
veto, or modification. There have been no recent recriminations over
the issue but it is always in the wings, as perhaps another, inevitable
result of the divided Treaty Power.
Presidential agreements other than treaties are not mentioned in
the Constitution. But the Framers clearly understood that nations
23. Congressional Record, reprinted in 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 10-15 (1988).
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make some agreements that are not treaties, 24 and they could not help
but anticipate tacit, informal understandings by the President with
representatives of foreign states. Early in our history, Presidents be-
gan to make written, formal agreements on their own authority, and
there have been many thousands since, made without first obtaining
the consent of the Senate or of Congress.
It is now established that the President can make some agreements
on his own authority. On the other hand, it is indisputable that there
are some agreements he cannot make without Senate consent. But
which agreements are in which category? The courts have not helped
with any general, principled, guidance. They have given effect to
agreements incidental to some admittedly Presidential function, e.g.,
Franklin Roosevelt's agreement incidental to his recognition of the
USSR, and claims settlements, such as the Iranian Hostages Agree-
ment.25 Military armistices, such as the agreements that effectively
terminated World War I and the Korean and Vietnam Wars, have
been commonly accepted as within the President's authority as Com-
mander in Chief.
Congressional attempts to regulate executive agreements have
stumbled over the difficulty of distinguishing agreements which the
President may, should, perhaps must, do alone, from those that should
require Senate consent. 26 In 1969, the Senate adopted the non-binding
Commitments Resolution declaring that the President could not com-
mit the armed forces or financial resources of the United States with-
out Senate consent or Congressional approval, 27 but no President has
openly accepted even that limitation. The Senate considered but did
not adopt the Clark Resolution,28 which sought to compel the Execu-
tive Branch to consult the Senate as to the method of concluding a
particular agreement. For now, Congress has contented itself with re-
quiring the Executive Branch to report every executive agreement
made. 29 It is not clear that there is serious scrutiny of these agreements
24. Article I, section 10, distinguishes between treaties which States are forbidden to make,
and compacts or agreements which States may make with the consent of Congress.
25. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
26. The Bricker Amendment included a provision that would have limited executive agree-
ments, and that provision might have been adopted had there been agreement as to which agree-
ments were to be regulated.
27. See 115 CONG. REC. 17,245 (1969).
28. S. Res. 536, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). See T. FRANCK & M. GLENNON, FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 396-99 (1987).
29. 1 U.S.C § 112(b) (1982). The original Case Act was amended to require that oral agree-
ments be reduced to writing and transmitted, apparently to ensure that there is no attempt to
circumvent the requirement to inform Congress by making oral agreements.
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but perhaps the need to report helps deter the Executive from making
agreements that would arouse Senate ire and invite its% adverse
reaction.
For the rest, we have another intractable constitutional problem.
Periodically, the Senate bristles at an executive agreement, and some-
times threatens to use its political weapons, both treaty and not-treaty
related, e.g., its power to hold up confirmation of the President's ap-
pointments. The Senate also has weapons as part of the legislature, to
"punish" the Executive by adopting or not adopting laws or withhold-
ing appropriations.
TREATY-MAKING IN A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
That is the treaty power today; how does it look for the years
ahead?
Unlike issues between Congress and the President in the "twilight
zone,"' 30 contemporary issues of treaty-making do not depend on dif-
ferences of interpretation of constitutional text or of original intent.
What we have is chronic unhappiness with the prescribed bifurcation
of the treaty-power and with its implications and consequences. There
appears to be an amazing acquiescence in keeping the Treaty Power as
it is, perhaps a reflection of a general reluctance to tamper with our
constitutional institutions.
If raised at all, questions about the Treaty Power ask how to make
the existing process work better. I venture to ask first whether the
constitutional procedure is consistent with our political ideology -
whether the original decision of the Framers to share the treaty power
continues to maintain their concerns for constitutionalism, and
whether it responds to our commitment to democracy today. And
would greater democratization of the process make it easier or more
difficult for the United States to cooperate with other nations in the
21 st century?
It is relevant to recall the Framers' political ideology. 31 They were
committed to social contract, to constitutionalism, to republicanism.
The Constitution was a social contract among the people to institute a
government, as well as a contract between the people and the govern-
ment-to-be - the people consenting to be governed, the officers of
government committing themselves to respect the constitutional
blueprint and its limitations. For the Framers, the Constitution im-
30. See supra note 2.
31. I address the Framers' ideology in the first of the Cooley Lectures. See also Henkin, The
United States Constitution as a Social Compact, in A More Perfect Union: Essays on the Constitu-
tion, 131 PRoc. AM. PHIL. Soc'Y, September 1987.
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plied a commitment to constitutionalism - to government according
to and limited by a written constitution, to government with agreed
powers for agreed purposes, subject to the rule of law. For them, con-
stitutionalism implied fractionalized authority to prevent concentra-
tion of power and the danger of tyranny. Constitutionalism implied
also the reservation of a large private domain and retained rights for
every individual.
The Framers were republicans. For them that implied government
by the people through chosen representatives. But, as is evident from
the Constitution they drafted, representatives could be chosen either
directly by popular vote - the House of Representatives - or indi-
rectly - the Senate to be chosen by the State legislatures, the Presi-
dent by electors appointed as the State legislatures direct.
Government by the people, moreover, did not mean by all the people.
Slaves and even free blacks, women, and persons without sufficient
property, were not eligible to vote. It has been estimated that only five
percent of the inhabitants of the United States voted for the delegates
to the state conventions that ratified the Constitution. Not many more
were eligible to vote in 1789 for members of the House of Representa-
tives, or for the popularly elected branch of the state legislatures which
determined how the President and Senators were chosen.
Much has changed in the country and in our institutions of gov-
ernment. In particular, we have become a democracy, a representative
constitutional democracy. Senators are still elected by state, not ac-
cording to population, but they are elected directly. 32 The indirect
election of the President is the barest formality: we have rarely - and
now, not for a hundred years - elected a President who did not re-
ceive a majority of the votes cast, and we decry and fear that possibil-
ity because it would be undemocratic. Above all, we have achieved
universal suffrage. Constitutional amendments eliminated voting bar-
riers for Blacks, women, the poor (by poll and other taxes), persons of
ages 18 to 21. The Supreme Court has ruled that the equal protection
of the laws requires an equal vote for all.33
Our transformation to a representative democracy has not brought
any constitutional change in our governance. The United States has
been transformed, the federal government has been transformed, Con-
gress and the Presidency have been transformed, but except for the
move to direct election of senators - now 75 years ago - the Consti-
tution has not been amended to modify the framework of government,
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
33. U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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the distribution of governmental authority among the Branches, or the
powers and functions of any Branch. It is difficult to believe that, as-
suming continued commitment to our Congressional-Presidential sys-
tem, we would decide today to distribute governmental authority in
the way the Framers did. Surely, a contemporary blueprint of govern-
ment would reflect better that we are now a constitutional democracy
rather than only a republic.
The Framers' commitment to constitutionalism, and our commit-
ment to democracy, I have suggested,34 should shape our constitu-
tional jurisprudence in the "twilight zone" where the distribution of
authority between Congress and the President is concurrent or uncer-
tain, and where constitutional confrontation is our daily lot. Here I
address the significance of that political ideology in considering the
adequacy for the next century of our constitutional jurisprudence on
treaties.
In fact, the treaty power - as it was conceived, and as it is - may
be an authentic expression of constitutionalism; surely it provides
checks and balances. Giving the power to make treaties to the Presi-
dent, but only with Senate advice-and-consent, was designed, and
serves, to limit and diffuse the treaty power and to prevent its ready
and easy use. For the Framers, the dominant motive of that particular
form of checks and balances may have been to protect the interests of
some of the States, but the result was to prevent concentration of the
treaty power in the Executive, as was then the practice in Europe. At
the same time, the Framers decided not to leave treaty-making to the
Senate alone; giving the President the power to negotiate and later to
make the treaty created a counter-weight to the Senate and made the
negotiating process less inefficient.
Constitutionalism demands limitation and diffused power but it
does not require a particular form or locus of diffusion. The loci of
allocated power, however, are relevant to democracy. Now that suf-
frage is universal and the United States has thus become a democracy,
democratic precepts should permeate our constitutional dispositions.
Is the treaty power, as we have it, appropriate for a democracy? Is
that all the democracy that the needs of international treaty-making
can accommodate?
The Framers gave the President a role in the Treaty Power when
he was not to be democratically chosen and not authentically repre-
sentative of or responsive and accountable to the people. Now the
Presidency is part of our dual democracy; the President is elected vir-
34. See supra note 2.
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tually directly (though by a process weighted along state lines), and is
accountable quadrennially. For the Framers, the Senate's role in
treaty-making was not designed to serve some democratic purpose; as
Anti-Federalists noted at the time, the Senate was to be an aristocratic
body, and it was doubtless chosen for its role in treaty-making in part
because of its non-democratic character. Much later, the representa-
tive character of the Senate improved with direct election (Amend-
ment XVII), and quite recently with universal suffrage. But the
Senate is still only one house of Congress, still the less representative,
less accountable house, still the "aristocratic," "States' rights" branch.
One way of rendering treaty-making more democratic without
constitutional amendment might be to have agreements made by the
President if authorized or approved by both Houses of Congress, a
procedure that has been called the Congressional-Executive agree-
ment. It now is accepted that the Congressional-Executive agreement
is a constitutionally acceptable alternative to the treaty method for
United States adherence to any international agreement - an example
of constitutional construction that developed for other reasons but
could serve also the cause of greater democracy. The House has
sought some such procedure for 200 years, and the Congressional-Ex-
ecutive agreement has in fact been used regularly for some kinds of
agreements - e.g., trade agreements generally 35 - but not from any
concession to democratic doctrine and without any principle to guide
choice between this method and the treaty method.
There is much - in addition to the more democratic character of
that procedure for making agreements - to commend the Congres-
sional-Executive agreement. Especially since treaties are automati-
cally law or require Congress to enact implementing legislation, 36
treaty-makers are law-makers, and the Congressional-Executive agree-
ment avoids law-making by less than a full, democratic legislature.
Implementation, if necessary, could be accomplished at the time Con-
gress (both Houses) consented to the agreement.
37
35. Beginning early in our history, Congress decided that some agreements do not require
Senate consent, for example, when it authorized the Postmaster General to conclude interna-
tional postal agreements.
36. See infra page 425. The Congressional-Executive agreement gives both Houses equal
authority to advise and consent, therefore to veto or modify the agreement. In the case of a
treaty to which the Senate has consented, it is established that both Houses are constitutionally
obligated to enact any necessary implementing legislation or appropriate any necessary funds.
37. Congress has developed procedures for expediting implementation of international agree-
ments, notably by fast-track procedures. See, e.g., J. JACKSON, V. Louis & M. MATSUSHITA,
IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECO-
NOMIC RULES 162-68 (1984); J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 151 (2d ed. 1986).
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Presidents might have reason to resist the Congressional-Executive
agreement if it became the sole method of making international agree-
ments. That method might make the process even less efficient, would
double the obstacles to United States adherence (requiring consent of
two Houses instead of one), increase the number of committees, mem-
bers of Congress, and members of staff whose advice the Executive
would have to seek in order later to obtain Congressional consent.
38
On the other hand, Presidents sometimes are pleased to have a
choice between the two procedures, if only in order to appease the
House of Representatives and because the Congressional-Executive
agreement does not require the concurrence of two-thirds of the Sena-
tors present. For its part, the Senate would doubtless resist a change
that would eliminate its privileged status, and Senate consent would be
necessary for a constitutional amendment to that end since the Senate
is part of the ordinary amending process. Without constitutional
amendment, Senate consent would be necessary for establishing the
Congressional-Executive agreement by law, and Senate consent is in
effect necessary every time the President seeks approval of an interna-
tional agreement by joint resolutions. The Senate can refuse to con-
sider a joint resolution to approve an agreement and insist on the
treaty procedure. But considerations of democracy (and of comity be-
tween the two Houses) might be urged upon the Senate. The Senate
has accepted the joint resolution procedure for some subjects, notably
trade, and it may be time for the two Houses to seek - at least - to
develop a general principle for identifying international agreements
that might be sent to both Houses for approval rather than to the Sen-
ate alone.
The treaty power as we have it is not as democratic as it might be,
and without constitutional amendment it could be replaced, in whole
or in part, by the Congressional-Executive agreement, giving the more
representative House of Representatives a role equal to that of the Sen-
ate. But that change would make the process more cumbersome. Do
the claims of democracy demand that greater inefficiency?
39
38. For that reason, foreign countries - our potential treaty partners - might also not favor
such a modification; they would generally prefer freer use of sole executive agreements.
39. Apart from the issues arising out of treaty-making, another issue arose as to treaty-termi-
nating when President Carter acted to terminate the defense treaty with the Republic of China
(Taiwan) and to establish full relations with the People's Republic of China (Beijing). Senators
claimed that the President needed the consent of the Senate (or of Congress), and some Senators
took the issue to court, but the Supreme Court did not resolve it. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996 (1979). The Restatement has concluded that the President may terminate a treaty on
his own authority, both when the treaty permits termination and when termination by the United
States would violate its obligations under international law. Termination by the President alone
might be suspect under the aspects of both constitutionalism and of democracy, but under the
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TREATIES AS LAW
Constitutionalism and democracy are relevant to other treaty is-
sues, involving not the President and Senate and checks and balances
but the place of treaties in our constitutional jurisprudence.
The status of treaties in the constitutional system of the United
States is shaped by their international character. Treaties are a princi-
pal source of international law and the most important principle of
international law is pacta sunt servanda; that treaties are binding and
must be observed. There is, then, a binding obligation on the parties
to a treaty to carry out their obligations, but how a state does so is
ordinarily not a concern of international law: the status of treaties in
the domestic law of any country is a constitutional, not an interna-
tional, question. All states have incorporated international law into
their legal system to some extent in some ways, but states differ both
as to extent and as to ways. States differ also as to what - if anything
- is necessary to make a treaty part of national law, and with what
consequences.4°
United States jurisprudence on treaties is a hybrid of different ways
and conceptions. The Constitution, Article VI, declares that treaties
are law, and are supreme to State law. Article VI has been interpreted
as also declaring that treaties are equal to statutes in the constitutional
hierarchy, and therefore as mandating that in case of conflict between
a statute and a treaty the later in time prevails.
That principle applies to only some treaties. Thanks to John Mar-
prevailing view termination is seen as an aspect of the conduct of foreign relations which has
been and remains Presidential even in a constitutional democracy.
Issues as to the scope and uses of the Treaty Power - issues not between the President and
Senate but between the treaty-makers and Congress or the States - do not significantly implicate
considerations of democracy. They have virtually disappeared. It is no longer claimed that a
treaty will be given effect if it violates constitutional rights, but it is not seriously argued that
either principles of federalism or of separation of powers imply or warrant any limitation on the
subject matter of treaties. The power to make treaties was delegated to the Federal government
and neither the principle of enumerated powers, nor the Tenth Amendment which encapsulates
it, nor any "invisible radiation" from that Amendment, warrants limiting the Treaty Power. No
one now claims that the power to make treaties is limited by the legislative powers of Congress,
though it is commonly accepted that some matters can not be achieved by self-executing treaty
but require implementation by Congress. See infra note 41. The notion that some subjects, such
as a state's violation of the human rights of its inhabitants, are inherently not of international
concern and therefore not within the Treaty Power, died long ago.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 302
(1987); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (opinion of Black, J.); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
It is argued with increasing frequency that a treaty settling or otherwise affecting private
claims takes individual property for a public use and requires just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). If those arguments
prevail, it may reflect enhanced concern for individual property rights and reduced concern for
the public fisc and the taxpayer, in foreign affairs as elsewhere.
40. See supra note 19.
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shall, we distinguish for this purpose between self-executing treaties
and non-self-executing treaties.41 A treaty that is self-executing is to
be applied by the Executive and the courts automatically, immediately
upon its entry into force for the United States. Treaties that are non-
self-executing ordinarily require some implementing act, usually by
Congress. As a result, the Executive has to decide, as to every treaty,
whether it is necessary to seek implementing legislation. Courts have
to decide, when a case before them demands it, whether to give a
treaty or a treaty provision effect as law or to await implementation.
Increasingly, the mood in the Senate - and in the courts - is to
render, or interpret, treaties as non-self-executing and requiring imple-
mentation by Congress. This may please the House of Representatives
by giving it some voice in the treaty process, and even Senators some-
times wish to have another look at a treaty in the Senate's other capac-
ity, as a house of Congress enacting legislation. So long as we adhere
to the present procedure for making treaties, however, this trend to
render treaties not self-executing, I believe, is misguided. The interna-
tional obligation of the United States under a treaty is immediate,
whether a treaty is self-executing or not. Declaring a treaty to be non-
self-executing and requiring implementing legislation delays and cre-
ates obstacles to our carrying out our international obligations, en-
courages members of Congress to delay or frustrate legislation to give
effect to the treaty, especially Senators who did not favor the treaty
and, even more, members of the House of Representatives who had
not previously considered it. Little is gained, not even a second
thought, since the United States has an obligation to enact necessary
legislation promptly so as to enable it to carry out its obligations under
the treaty.
42
So long as we have self-executing treaties, we must face the possi-
bility of inconsistency between treaty and statute. Our jurisprudence
giving treaty and statute equal status so that the later in time will pre-
vail was developed a hundred years ago by constitutional construction
based, I believe, on misconstruction of Article VI. By that article, the
Framers clearly intended treaties to be binding on the States and on
State courts and supreme over State law, hence the appellation of Arti-
41. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). It is commonly accepted that some
treaties cannot be self-executing but require implementation by statute; e.g., to enact criminal
law, to appropriate funds, to declare war. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, § 11, comment i
and reporters' note 6.
42. The argument that we should not have self-executing treaties, since some other states do
not, misses the point. We render treaties self- executing not for the convenience of other states
but to facilitate our living up to our obligations. Rendering a treaty non-self-executing in no way
reduces or significantly postpones our legal obligations. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 39, at
§ 302, reporters' note 5.
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cle VI as "the supremacy clause." There is no evidence that, in that
article, the Framers also addressed the equality of treaties and United
States statutes. On the other hand, there is evidence elsewhere that, in
general, the Framers assumed that the United States - all the
Branches - would respect the Law of Nations, including treaty obli-
gations. Certainly, there is an argument for the supremacy of interna-
tional law and treaties in our jurisprudence, subject to the
Constitution.
The equality of statutes and treaties, then, is not, in my view, what
the Framers intended, and seems not to satisfy either democratic prin-
ciple or international need. If both the legislative process and the
treaty power are themselves democratic, democracy does not require
the supremacy of either laws or treaties, nor does it require their
equality. If the Supreme Court could be persuaded to reconsider 100
years of jurisprudence, we ought to look hard at European constitu-
tions, some of which provide for the supremacy of international law
and of treaties.
CONCLUSION
Under the Constitution, treaties are made by a process unique to
the United States, a special case of a larger, unique constitutional ar-
rangement for the conduct of foreign relations, itself part of a unique
Congressional-Presidential system. The treaty power was not
designed pursuant to an ideal principle or even a working model, but is
yet another of the Framers' second choices. It has not worked as in-
tended, Constitutional experience having denied the Senate a full, con-
tinuing participation and relegated it to a second stage of scrutiny and
modification or veto.
In two hundred years of history under the Treaty Power there
have been few issues of constitutional dimension. The ABM and INF
controversies of 1987-88 masqueraded as issues of constitutional con-
struction but were essentially, I think, reflections of political differ-
ences between independent constitutional bodies in the exercise of a
shared role, which neither is happy to share.
Neither the President nor the Senate is happy with the Treaty
Power. The President resents Senate disposition to reject, or shelve, or
"butcher" what has been negotiated "in the national interest." The
Senate resents its being excluded from the negotiating process, being
presented with a fait accompli, and being told it must take it "in the
national interest." The House of Representatives is the least happy,
sitting by, feeling like a second-class chamber. And our partners in
treaties-foreign governments-have long found the United States
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procedure incomprehensible and vexing, when agreements apparently
concluded are frequently rejected or reopened for renegotiation.
The unhappiness of both President and Senate is particularly acute
when addressing important treaties as to which both are sensitive and
ambivalent. Senate unhappiness is aggravated by recognition that its
role in treaty-making generally terminates with consent, whereas the
President, and later Presidents, continue to live with the treaty, inter-
preting and applying it. Senate unhappiness is exacerbated by fear
that - as in the case of the ABM Treaty - the President, or his
successor, may be tempted to reshape a treaty to which the Senate
remains better disposed. Senate resentment and resistance are strong
when it senses a threat to its constitutional treaty role, and they will be
stronger still when it believes that the Executive was not - is not -
wholly forthcoming and had been - is - less than candid.
Sole executive agreements - inevitable and having their place -
are not the answer to the tensions of the Treaty Power. The Framers
clearly contemplated a line between treaties and executive agreements,
but the line which the Framers would have drawn is unknown. Sole
executive agreements, moreover, raise storm signals for constitutional-
ism, since such agreements entail no checks. They are also insuffi-
ciently democratic. The Presidency is today a more democratic
institution than the one the Framers contemplated, but sole executive
agreements are not authentically democratic even today. They are
often secret or unknown, do not engage Executive responsibility, re-
sponsiveness, accountability, and have little relevance for the quadren-
nial Presidential plebiscite. Principles of constitutionalism and
democracy suggest a limited role for sole executive agreements, espe-
cially - but not only - if an agreement entails law-making and af-
fects individual rights.
The frictions of treaty-making are inherent in the shared function.
Recall Justice Brandeis's famous justification:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention
of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbi-
trary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of
the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental
powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.
43
I know no reason to assume that Justice Brandeis would except the
treaty power from that judgment. The Framers did not want autoc-
racy by treaty any more than by other Executive activity. History, I
think, has not proved them wrong, and transformations in the Presi-
dency, in the Senate, in the United States, in the international system,
43. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926).
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do not suggest that we should unshackle the President to make treaties
without Senate consent, as, for example, by narrow construction of
what is a treaty and large construction of the unwritten power to make
sole executive agreements.
The treaty process needs to be thought about, but no one seems
seriously to demand or contemplate change. This may come from a
sense that "if it ain't broke. .. ." Or perhaps treaties do not appear
important enough to warrant the trouble to try to change the process
of making them; perhaps unhappiness with the process is not great
enough to overcome inertia; perhaps the claims of democracy are not
heard; perhaps the claims of efficiency, the needs of the international
system and of diplomacy, prevent our moving to a more democratic
system; perhaps no better procedure seems available.
Dissatisfaction with the Treaty Power apart, perhaps constitu-
tional democracy now requires that restraints on the President should
be lodged not in the Senate but in the House - the more representa-
tive body - or in both Houses. Without formal amendment, I have
suggested, we can democratize the process by increased and orderly
resort to the Congressional-Executive agreement as an alternative to
the treaty procedure. But that "solution" would please only the
House and increase the unhappines of the others concerned. That
change if applied to all agreements might entail too great a sacrifice of
the needs of the United States in the international system. Does de-
mocracy - our dual democracy - demand it? Or is what we have,
the President combined with the Senate as they are now elected, demo-
cratic enough?
There are advantages to the Congressional-Executive agreement
but perhaps it is too cumbersome for general use. Perhaps we need a
streamlined intermediate version. Tentatively, I venture, Congress
could create a new, small, informal sub-constitutional body represent-
ing both Houses to deliberate together with the Executive. That body
would offer advice on international agreements early; consider what
agreements the President could make alone in principle, and whether
he or she could make a particular agreement on his or her own author-
- ity; develop guidelines for deciding between the treaty method and the
Congressional-Executive agreement and apply them in particular
cases; decide whether an agreement should be self-executing or should
require legislative implementation."
Together, the House and the Senate, as the legislature, might also
regulate and scrutinize sole executive agreements. The Executive now
44. Compare the Clark Resolution, supra note 28.
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reports the executive agreements he has made; 45 does any one look at
them? Better scrutiny of what the Executive has done might lead to
greater caution by the Executive in deciding not to seek the approval
of the Senate or of Congress. In turn, it might well lead also to more
orderly delegation to the President by Congress of authority to con-
clude agreements, thereby effectively converting all agreements into
Congressional-Executive agreements as a matter of constitutional au-
thority but without the cumbersomeness of that process.
Subject to such tinkering or tuning, in the complex governmental
system we have, we may be "stuck with" the treaty-making procedure
we have. As the Framers recognized, Congress cannot negotiate. As
history has demonstrated, we cannot return to formal advice by the
Senate as a whole. Although it developed from other considerations,
the treaty-making process the Framers gave us, even as it has been
modified by experience, does not in principle clearly offend constitu-
tionalism or democracy. But we will continue to have crises unless
both President and Senate take care to make the present procedure, or
a Congressional-Executive alternative, work. We need to move to-
wards greater cooperation and less adversariness between the
Branches, but that is easy to recommend and difficult to achieve in a
system of independent branches. The advice function ought to be rein-
troduced, not formally but regularly, and should include some advice
on important sole executive agreements. Later Presidents must not
attempt to shave treaty obligations by reinterpretation (or mis-inter-
pretation). The ABM controversy should not tempt the Senate to load
its consent with express understandings, to clutter treaties with condi-
tions, to jam the treaty process. In relations between them concerning
treaties, the President must be candid, the Senate must be restrained.
This is not a cheerful or ringing conclusion, but it is - I think -
the message of the still, small voice of the Constitution we have inher-
ited and are devoted to, in our kind of constitutional democracy in a
world of states.
45. See supra page 418.
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